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Abstract
Perhaps no Constitutional amendment gets tried and tested more than the Fourth Amendment.
Each year, thousands of criminal defendants bring legal challenges to the proceedings against
them rooted in claimed Fourth Amendment violations. Changing technology and its use fuels a
large part of this as new technology intersects with individual privacy in new ways. An oft heard
argument in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is that the Fourth Amendment must change in
order to keep up with the progress of time and societal change. Through an analysis of recent
case law examining Fourth Amendment protections and technology, this article concludes that
the United States Supreme Court has not changed its basic Fourth Amendment analytical model.

Introduction
The rapid advancement of technology, particularly in the past 100 years, has affected
every aspect of our lives. The use of such technology in both the commission of crime, and in
crime fighting, has been no exception. Modern criminal enterprises are increasingly using
computer networks and electronic devices to advance their nefarious activities. From identity
theft to mobile communication among criminal networks, the criminal world is advancing
through technology. Consequently, modern police agencies are now commonly equipped with
the latest technological advancements in criminal detection and apprehension. From surveillance
to weaponry, the police arsenal is also advancing.
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With every added device or technique, regardless of the user, much is written about the
use of the given technology and its impact on the criminal law. The discussion becomes more
focused when the question is how the given technology intersects with individual rights
protected by the Fourth Amendment. Courts have increasingly been asked to interpret how the
Fourth Amendment should apply when law enforcement searches or seizes in ways not
previously contemplated. Often this has occurred when police deploy new technologies. At
other times it has arisen from simply communicating in new ways – from telephones, to pagers,
to cellphones, to “smart” phones. Regardless of how the technology and the criminal law
intersect, each such intersection results in learned voices lamenting that the Fourth Amendment
has outlived its purpose and usefulness and calling for new protections of our venerated liberties.
One example is from the esteemed Professor of Constitutional Law, Erwin Chemerinsky. He has
argued in the American Bar Association Journal on more than one occasion that courts need to
do a better job of protecting liberties in light of technological advances.1 Last year, urging the
Court to adopt new categorical protections for what he called “informational privacy,”
Chemerinsky wrote, “Emerging technology gives the police unprecedented ability to gather
information about all of us. It is essential that the court do much better in this century in
providing Fourth Amendment protection for our privacy.” 2 Others have suggested alternative or

1

Chemerinsky, E. (2013). Does the Fourth Amendment Still Fit the 21 st Century? ABA Journal,
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/chemerinsky_does_the_fourth_amendment_still_fit_the
_21st_century/.
Chemerinsky, E. (2014). Is it Time to Go High-tech on the Fourth Amendment?, ABA Journal,
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/chemerinsky_is_it_time_to_go_high_tech_on_the_fourt
h_amendment/.
2
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“new” approaches to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in an effort to address emerging
technologies.
Yet, despite the advancement of technology and its application to crime fighting in all of
its various manifestations, the text of the Fourth Amendment has not changed. And the courts
that have interpreted it, including most importantly, the Supreme Court of the United States,
have not drastically changed the basic analytical approach when applying the Amendment’s
protections. A review of two forms of technology – and recent cases that analyze their impact on
the Fourth Amendment – will demonstrate that wholesale change has not occurred and that
liberties are still being protected by the Fourth Amendment. And this protection is occurring
long after, and in ways never contemplated, by the men who drafted the Amendment’s language.

GPS and United States v. Jones
The use of satellites to navigate the earth, through the Global Positioning System, or
GPS, started in the mid-1970s. 3 The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) describes GPS as
“a space-based radio-navigation system consisting of a constellation of satellites and a network
of ground stations used for monitoring and control.”4 Currently, according to the FAA, “32 GPS
satellites orbit the Earth at an altitude of approximately 11,000 miles providing users with

3

http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ato/service_units/techops/navservices
/history/. For a comprehensive explanation of the technology behind GPS, see
http://geology.isu.edu/geostac/Field_Exercise/GPS/GPS_basics_u_blox_en.pdf
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accurate information on position, velocity, and time anywhere in the world and in all weather
conditions.”5 This network and its capabilities allow humans to pinpoint our location in real time
all around the globe. Such technology is great for the average traveler; however, it is also very
advantageous to law enforcement in the tracking of criminal suspects. Of course, law
enforcement must square its actions with the Fourth Amendment, and recently the Supreme
Court of the United States had occasion to consider the intersection of the Fourth Amendment
and GPS technology.
In early 2012, the Court decided a case from the District of Columbia circuit entitled
United States v. Jones.6 The defendant in the case, Antoine Jones, had been the target of a drug
trafficking investigation conducted jointly by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the
District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department. 7 In an effort to track Jones’s whereabouts
and establish a pattern of trafficking, officers applied to the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia for a search warrant. The warrant request sought permission to place a
tracking device on a vehicle owned by Jones’s wife, so that the vehicle’s location could be
tracked via Global Positioning (Satellite) Systems (GPS).8 Although the warrant issued, officers
installed the device outside of the permitted time frame and outside of the District of Columbia.
(The device was installed while the vehicle was parked in Maryland.) 9 Over the following four

5

Id.
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United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 565 U.S. ___ (2012).
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Id., 132 S. Ct. at 948.
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weeks, officers tracked the vehicle’s movements, collecting more than two thousand pages of
data from multiple satellites. The data purported to connect Jones to a drug trafficking
conspiracy, including the location of the conspirators’ “stash house” where law enforcement
seized large amounts of cocaine and cash. Ultimately, Jones was convicted and sentenced to life
in prison. 10
When the case reached the Supreme Court, the sole question the Court considered was
whether the government’s attachment of the GPS device to a vehicle, and its subsequent
monitoring of the vehicle’s movements using that device, constituted a search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 11 The Court unanimously answered that precise question in
the affirmative.12 The Court was rather fractured, however, on the rationale leading to that
conclusion, resulting in two concurring opinions. Justice Alito, joined by Justices Ginsburg,
Breyer, and Kagan, disagreed with the rationale provided by Justice Scalia’s majority opinion.
Justice Sotomayor wrote separately, seemingly agreeing with the rationale of both camps.
Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court based its rationale on the common law doctrine of
trespass. He reasoned that the police efforts in Jones’s case constituted a search because the
government “physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining information.” 13
In classic “originalist” fashion, he notes that the Court’s approach would have undoubtedly been
the common understanding at the time of the Amendment’s adoption, even citing the historic
10

Id.

11

Id.

12

Id. at 949.
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English case of Entick v. Carrington.14 Scalia further notes that Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence was aligned with the law of trespass until the late 20 th century, when the Court
began to adopt a “privacy” based approach through Katz v. United States and the cases that
followed it.15 Those cases, as Scalia notes, built upon a concurrence in Katz to set the standard
for Fourth Amendment analysis thus: Has a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy been
violated? Katz is oft-cited for the proposition that the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places (a phrase derived directly from the text of Katz). Scalia clearly challenges the exclusivity
of that proposition and asserts that a place-based approach to the Fourth Amendment has always
been understood and still has effect.16 This is where Alito and others part company with the
Scalia opinion.
Justice Alito, in his concurrence, asserts that the Scalia analysis is unwise and has “little
if any support in current Fourth Amendment case law…. (Emphasis added)” 17 Alito, thus,
asserts that the Court should analyze the case along the more modern formulary created by Katz
and the cases that followed and ask whether the defendant’s reasonable expectations of privacy
were violated. In essence, Alito is disagreeing with Scalia that the trespass doctrine is still viable

14

Id. Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765), is often noted among scholars as
influential in Fourth Amendment history.
15

Id. at 950, citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).

16

Id.

17

Id. at 958.
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for Fourth Amendment purposes, asserting that Katz “did away with the old approach, holding
that a trespass was not required….” 18
Justice Sotomayor, in her solo concurrence, lands squarely on both sides. She asserts that
the placement of the GPS on Jones’s vehicle was a search because of the physical trespass, yet
she agrees that the reasonable expectation of privacy analysis also applies. 19 She maintains this
cautious approach because she agrees with Alito’s assertion that much government surveillance
can now be done without physical intrusion, so the Katz formulary must remain intact.20 Indeed,
the odd posture of the several opinions in this case have led one commentator to conclude that
there is, in essence, two majority opinions because Justice Sotomayor expressly agrees with
Scalia’s trespass approach, but also lends a fifth vote to Alito’s advocacy for the privacy
approach.21
Other commentators have weighed in on the oddity of the Court’s posture. John
Whitehead, writing for the Rutherford Institute, argues that the ruling does not go far enough to
protect various forms of surveillance such as drones, “smart dust” devices, and a host of other
techno-gadgetry.22 And Professor Sherry Colb, of Cornell Law School, expresses in an analysis
18

Id. at 959.

19

Id. at 955.

20

Id.

21

See Tom Goldstein, Reactions to Jones v. United States: The government fared much better
than everyone realizes, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 23, 2012),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/01/reactions-to-jones-v-united-states-the-government-faredmuch-better-than-everyone-realizes/
22

https://www.rutherford.org/publications_resources/john_whiteheads_commentary/us_v_jones_
the_battle_for_the_fourth_amendment_continues
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for Justia.com’s Verdict publication that Justice Alito’s analysis is compelling, yet she expresses
confidence in the Scalia approach as a minimal one.23 As with each Supreme Court opinion,
numerous voices will opine on what the new state of the law is. As we consider the state of the
Fourth Amendment and the various doctrines it has produced, let us do so from the perspective
of one other form of ubiquitous technology – the cellular phone.

Mobile phones and Riley v. California
With the pervasive nature of mobile phones, more and more criminals and police officers
are utilizing the devices as they go about their trades. Coupled with the rapidly evolving state of
cell phone technology, courts began to split on just how to analyze the cases before them.
Specifically, the recurring question became when, if ever, is it permissible for police to conduct a
warrantless search of a suspect’s cell phone? In the latter part of the last decade, several federal
courts analyzed the issue. In United States v. Finley, the Fifth Circuit held that a warrantless
search of an arrestee’s cell phone was lawful incident to his arrest.24 The Fourth Circuit held
similarly in United States v. Murphy.25 However, two state supreme courts considered the
question and arrived at opposite conclusions. In State v. Smith, the Supreme Court of Ohio held

23

Colb’s analysis appeared in two parts: Part 1 - http://verdict.justia.com/2012/02/08/thesupreme-court-decides-the-gps-case-united-states-v-jones-and-the-fourth-amendment-evolves;
and Part 2 - http://verdict.justia.com/2012/02/15/the-supreme-court-decides-the-gps-case-unitedstates-v-jones-and-the-fourth-amendment-evolves-2
24

United States v. Finley (5th Cir. 2007) 477 F.3d 250.

25

United States v. Murphy (4th Cir. 2009) 552 F.3d 405; see also, United States v. Ortiz, 84 F.3d
977, 984 (7th Cir. 1996).
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that such warrantless searches violate the Fourth Amendment. 26 Thirteen months later, in People
v. Diaz, the Supreme Court of California held in accordance with the previous federal court
holdings.27 Throughout this time period, there were multiple suggestions in various legal
publications urging alternative solutions to the question and urging the Supreme Court of the
United States to settle the issue. 28 Ultimately, the Supreme Court did settle the question squarely
in 2014 when it decided Riley v. California.29

A review of the Riley decision indicates that

although technology changes the Fourth Amendment has not and that the Court does not appear
poised to change the basic analytical approach to search and seizure jurisprudence.
The Riley case actually consisted of two, consolidated appeals, Riley v. California from
the state courts of California, and United States v. Wurie, a federal court appeal from the First
Circuit. In Riley, the defendant was arrested for driving on a suspended license, and an officer
seized a cell phone from Riley’s pants pocket during a search incident to the arrest. 30 Following
transport to the police station, a police detective examined the contents of Riley’s phone because
law enforcement suspected Riley was involved in gang activity. The detective found

26

State v. Smith, 124 Ohio St.3d 163, 2009-Ohio-6426; Cert. denied, Smith v. State (2010), 131
S.Ct. 102, 178 L.E.2d 242.
27

People v. Diaz, 51 Cal. 4th 84, 244 P.3d 501, 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 105 (Cal. January 3, 2011).

28

See Gershowitz, The iPhone Meets the Fourth Amendment (2008), 56 UCLA L. Rev. 27;
Stillwagon, Note, Bringing an End to Warrantless Cell Phone Searches (2008), 42 Ga. L. Rev.
1165; and Orso, Cellular Phones, Warrantless Searches, and the New Frontier of Fourth
Amendment Jurisprudence (2010), 50 Santa Clara L. Rev. 183.
29

Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473 (2014).

30

Riley, supra, at 2480.
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photographs and videos linking Riley to both gang activity and a prior criminal offense. 31 He
was charged in connection with that offense, along with an added gang specification that
increased the potential penalty for the crime. 32
In the Wurie case, the defendant was arrested for a drug trafficking offense and officers
seized two cell phones from his possession. 33 One of the phones was getting repeated calls from
a number identified as “my house” on the phone’s call log, which the officers used to trace and
locate the home so identified. 34 Officers secured a warrant to search the home and found
evidence therein of drugs, drug trafficking, weapons, and cash. 35 Based on this evidence, Wurie
was charged with multiple drug trafficking related offenses. 36 In both of the underlying appeals,
the lower courts held that the warrantless searches of the defendants’ cell phones did not violate
the Fourth Amendment. The Court in Riley disagreed.
Unlike the issue in Jones, there was no doubt in both Riley cases that the access of the
phones’ data by law enforcement amounted to a search of the phones. The core issue in Riley,
instead, was whether or not the searches of the cell phones amounted to a search “incident to
arrest” as the Court had long held was an exception to the warrant requirement. The Court’s
previously pronounced rule on the search incident to arrest doctrine was most famously
31

Id. at 2481.

32

Id.

33

Id.

34

Id.

35

Id.

36

Id. at 2482.
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discussed decades prior in Chimel v. California.37 The search incident to arrest doctrine is fairly
straight-forward: Once an officer lawfully arrests a suspect it is reasonable (and thus does not
violate the Fourth Amendment) for the officer to search and seize the person and the
immediately surrounding area of the suspect for any weapons or contraband, so as to protect the
officer and prevent the destruction of evidence. This seemingly simple rule was, of course,
stretched and tested by later cases whose facts did not fit neatly into that analysis. The first case
to do so was United States v. Robinson, in which the arresting officer seized – and proceeded to
further search – a cigarette package found on a suspect.38 The Court in Robinson found that
search to be reasonable. The Court later refused to extend the principle to other personal
property of a suspect - namely, a locked footlocker which was in the trunk of a vehicle - in
United States v. Chadwick.39 The question, as it pertains to cell phones, then, could be framed
thus: Is a cell phone like a cigarette package or other “container” on a suspect’s person, or is it
more akin to a locked footlocker? However, the issue need not be analyzed strictly in that
fashion. The underlying question is not what “category” of property the cell phone fits into;
rather, what privacy interest does it possess? The essence of the inquiry is the privacy interest
involved in the various items to be searched and seized balanced against the governmental
interests at stake. This is precisely how the Riley court analyzed the issue.
At the outset of the Court’s analysis in Riley, this balancing analysis is clearly displayed:

37

Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).

38

United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).

39

United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
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“Absent more precise guidance from the founding era, we generally determine
whether to exempt a given type of search from the warrant requirement "by
assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual's
privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of
legitimate governmental interests." Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300
(1999). Such a balancing of interests supported the search incident to arrest
exception in Robinson, and a mechanical application of Robinson might well
support the warrantless searches at issue here. But while Robinson's categorical
rule strikes the appropriate balance in the context of physical objects, neither of its
rationales has much force with respect to digital content on cell phones. On the
government interest side, Robinson concluded that the two risks identified in
Chimel-harm to officers and destruction of evidence-are present in all custodial
arrests. There are no comparable risks when the search is of digital data. In
addition, Robinson regarded any privacy interests retained by an individual after
arrest as significantly diminished by the fact of the arrest itself. Cell phones,
however, place vast quantities of personal information literally in the hands of
individuals. A search of the information on a cell phone bears little resemblance
to the type of brief physical search considered in Robinson. We therefore decline
to extend Robinson to searches of data on cell phones, and hold instead that
officers must generally secure a warrant before conducting such a search.” 40
The above citation is just a small indication of the Court’s commitment to traditional
Fourth Amendment analysis. In fact, the Court spends approximately the next ten pages of its
opinion discussing why cell phones have heightened privacy interests. And it spends significant
time examining why the governmental interests are lessened or not at all present. So does this
suggest that the Court is creating a “special rule” for cell phones, or changing the Fourth
Amendment in order to keep up with advances in technology? I suggest not. The Court is
merely doing Fourth Amendment analysis the same as it always has – balancing competing
interests in order to decide if officers acted reasonably in light of the circumstances.

40

Riley, supra, at 2484-2485.
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“The More Things Change…”
There is an old saying that “The more things change, the more they stay the same.” 41 I
think the saying rings true if it be said of the Fourth Amendment. For the “touchstone” of all
Fourth Amendment analysis is reasonableness. 42 The language gives us one clear protection – a
protection from the unreasonable actions of governmental agents. And whether the government
action is viewed as one of trespass (Jones), or one that intrudes upon an expectation of privacy
(Katz, Riley), the bottom line analysis is whether that government action was reasonable in light
of the totality of the circumstances. Stated another way, is there sufficient governmental interest
at hand to outweigh the privacy interests of the individual so affected by the governmental
action? Presumably, a trespass can have such sufficient interests. The Jones court noted that the
Government raised such a proposition at the Supreme Court but failed to raise the argument
below, thus forfeiting it. Accordingly, the Court declined to consider it.43 Similarly, the
warrantless search of a cell phone may be justified by heightened governmental interests that
outweigh the privacy interests of the phone’s owner. In Riley the Court stated: “If "the police
are truly confronted with a 'now or never' situation," - for example, circumstances suggesting that
a defendant's phone will be the target of an imminent remote-wipe attempt - they may be able to
rely on exigent circumstances to search the phone immediately.” 44

41

This saying has been attributed by several sources to French novelist Alphonse Karr. See, e.g.,
http://www.phrases.org.uk/bulletin_board/8/messages/679.html
42

Riley, 134 S.Ct. at 2482; citing Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006).

43

Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954.

44

Riley, supra, at 2487, citing Missouri v. McNeely, 269 U.S. ___ (2013).
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In either of these scenarios, if the governmental interest is great and the privacy interest is
lesser, reasonableness is found. Conversely, if the governmental interest is diminished and the
privacy interest is great, then the search will be deemed unreasonable. It is this balancing of
interests that the court has always done.45 Why is this so? - Because the fulcrum on which the
balance rests is the word “reasonable.” The Fourth Amendment tilts to and fro on this fulcrum,
and each case presents unique facts which may tip the balance in one direction or the other change one fact, change the outcome. This formulary frustrates law enforcement – and indeed
many of my students. They would prefer clear rules, categories, and doctrine. However, as the
inimitable Judge Richard Posner of the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals recently remarked with
respect to the Fourth Amendment, “I don’t start with doctrine… That’s backward looking.” 46
Academics and commentators may decry the “usefulness” of the Amendment in the modern age
and demand that it be updated to keep in step with modern technology. 47 But in the end, the
Fourth Amendment demands only that officers act reasonably in light of the circumstances. As
noted by Judge Posner, the text of the Amendment is rather “empty” and looking at past cases is
“unhelpful.”48 The only real inquiry is whether or not the officers in the case acted reasonably –
that is all the Fourth Amendment demands.

45

Riley, supra, at 2484; citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999).

46

The forum at which Judge Posner made these remarks was hosted by the Georgetown Law
Center and was entitled “Cybercrime and the Fourth Amendment. See http://www.cspan.org/video/?323068-3/discussion-cyber-crime-fourth-amendment, for the full video of the
symposium. For a view of Judge Posner’s opening comments, see the video from minutes 10:00
through 17:30.
47

See Notes 1 and 28, supra.

48

See Note 46, supra.
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So at the end of the day, regardless of what new technology comes our way, the Fourth
Amendment has not changed, nor has the Court’s basic analysis of the reasonableness standard.
Indeed, the more things change, the more the Fourth Amendment stays the same. And it is
unlikely to be altered any time soon.

Conclusion
Scholars often attempt to analyze court opinions to determine in which “direction” the
courts are driving a given legal principle. Admittedly, two select Fourth Amendment cases from
the Supreme Court do not definitively point us in the “direction” of our Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. But perhaps they do indicate that that there is no driving or direction to be had.
Technology, phraseology, and people may change, but the text of the Fourth Amendment has
not.
It is claimed that cartoonist Charles M. Schulz wrote, in the voice of his canine character,
Snoopy: “Yesterday I was a dog. Today I’m a dog. Tomorrow, I will probably still be a dog.
Sigh! There’s so little hope for advancement.”49 I suppose that if the Fourth Amendment had a
voice, it might lament in similar fashion. Perhaps it would groan, along with others, that its
simple text has, and is, and always will be, simple, seeing little hope for advancement. On the
other hand, it just might rejoice in its simplicity, its timelessness, and its great effectiveness
throughout our American centuries to keep us free from abusive governmental agents.

49

Charles M. Schulz. (n.d.). BrainyQuote.com. Retrieved January 6, 2015, from
BrainyQuote.com Web site: http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/c/charlesms189858.html
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